New insight: Building an actionable exposure program

Advisory Services

Threat Modelling

Cyberus facilitates a model that makes assumptions visible and turns plausible threats into design decisions.

  • Agreed system or business process
  • Assets, actors and trust boundaries
  • Prioritized misuse scenarios
  • Control decisions and open questions

The proposition

Make security assumptions visible early

Make security assumptions visible early enough for architecture and delivery teams to act on them. The work focuses on agreed system or business process and records where evidence or authorization limits the conclusion.

A model supports decisions, not prediction

Threat modelling creates a shared view of what matters, how a system is trusted and how it could be misused. It is most useful when engineers, owners and security practitioners can challenge the same representation.

Cyberus records assumptions, scope and unresolved questions. The model helps prioritize plausible scenarios but does not claim to enumerate every future threat.

Design-stage misuse reasoning

  1. Trust boundary crossing. A request, identity or data item moves between parts of the system with different trust.
  2. Abuse of an assumption. Someone acts in a way the designers never expected, using a gap in what was assumed.
  3. Design-stage control. A decision made while designing, such as validation, separation or logging, breaks the path.
  4. Exposed business asset. Without the control, the asset the system exists to protect is put at risk.

Why it matters

  • Business risk: Design flaws found after release are costly to change, and teams often discover them only when something goes wrong.
  • Decision it supports: Architects and owners can change designs, accept named risks and decide what needs testing before build effort is spent.
  • What you receive: You receive a shared system picture, prioritized misuse scenarios and a backlog of decisions and open questions for the agreed system.

A model linked to engineering work

System representation

Maps components, data flows, identities, dependencies and trust boundaries.

Why it matters
People rarely share the same mental picture of a system until it is drawn out together.
Supports
One agreed view of components and trust
Misuse scenarios

Describes plausible actions, affected assets and the assumptions behind priority.

Why it matters
Scenarios tied to assets and assumptions focus attention on what could actually hurt the business.
Supports
Ranking misuse by plausibility and consequence
Control review

Connects preventive, detective and recovery controls to selected scenarios.

Why it matters
Controls only matter if they map to a scenario, and gaps show where one is missing.
Supports
Linking prevention, detection and recovery to risk
Decision backlog

Records owners, design changes, accepted assumptions and questions needing evidence.

Why it matters
Decisions that are not written down get revisited, forgotten or quietly reversed.
Supports
Owned actions and visible, accepted assumptions

How threat modelling runs

  1. Define the model boundary

    Agree the system, lifecycle stage, assets and decision audience.

    Why it matters
    A clear boundary and audience keep the session about decisions rather than an endless system tour.
  2. Represent the design

    Map data, identities, components, dependencies and trust changes with owners.

    Why it matters
    Drawing flows and trust changes exposes assumptions that nobody had stated aloud.
  3. Explore misuse

    Generate and prioritize plausible scenarios using context rather than a checklist alone.

    Why it matters
    Context-driven scenarios catch problems a generic checklist would not know to ask about.
  4. Choose responses

    Record controls, design actions, assumptions and questions for later validation.

    Why it matters
    Recording choices and questions gives later testing and design work a clear starting list.

Why choose Cyberus for threat modelling

The model can focus design and assurance work on plausible scenarios. Its accuracy depends on the system information and participants available at the time.

  • Subject

    An agreed system or process

  • View

    Assets, flows and trust boundaries

  • Analysis

    Prioritized misuse scenarios

  • Action

    Owned design decisions

Threat Modelling

Frequently asked questions

Must the system already be built?

No. Modelling during design can influence choices before they become expensive, while an existing system provides evidence from the implemented architecture.

Which threat-modelling method is used?

The method is selected for the system and decision; scope and terminology are explained rather than implying one framework fits every case.

Does the model replace security testing?

No. It can identify what testing should examine, while testing provides evidence about implemented controls.

Talk to a specialist

Tell us about your environment, timing and the outcome you need, and a member of the Cyberus team can follow up to discuss scope.

Team certifications

Individual qualifications held by members of the Cyberus team. They are not company accreditations, and not every consultant on an engagement holds every badge.

Model an important system

Share the architecture, lifecycle stage and decisions the threat model should support.

Talk to a specialist
Talk to a specialist